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ABSTRACT
The Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 between Russia and
France was a minor slowing of the flow of the Napoleonic
Wars that dominated Europe in the early nineteenth cen
tury.

It united the two nations against Britain, but, in

larger terms, it polarized continental Europe into two
separate (or distinct) conflicting spheres.

The treaty

and its effects provided a foreshadowing of post-World
War I Europe and the subsequent twentieth-century concept
of peaceful coexistence.
The major personalities involved in making the
treaty were Alexander I of Russia and Napoleon Bonaparte
of France.

Their meeting on a boat in the Niemen River

had frequently been depicted as a romantic convergence of
east and west, yet, the theatrical air of these conversa
tions quickly disintegrated into the polarization of
France and Russia after 1807.

But the general mood of

the period, at least for Russia, was one of hopeful
anticipation.
The diplomacy of Polish Prince Adam Jerzy
Czartoryski, who served as Alexander's Foreign Minister
in the period leading up to the actual negotiations,
suggested an uncanny understanding of European realities
vi

along with a heightened sense of idealism and a desire
for continental peace.

But the Treaty of Tilsit was never

intended to bring peace and serve as a permanent agreement.
In the end, the treaty offered Russia the opportunity
to join the theater of European affairs as an equal mem
ber.

The treaty defined Russia, formerly an unknown

quantity of the east, as a legitimate power in the affairs
of the west and, therefore, worthy of Bonaparte's diplo
matic consideration.

vii

INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 between France and
Russia was a minor slowing of the flow of the Napoleonic
Wars that dominated European affairs in the early nine
teenth century.

It united the two nations in a war

against Britain, but, in larger terms, it polarized
continental Europe into two separate and distinct spheres
of influence.

Therefore, although the Treaty achieved a

fitful peace, it was not intended to serve as a perma
nent agreement and stop hostilities.
The period surrounding the treaty has often been
depicted by historians as a psychological battle between
the two emperors, Tsar Alexander I of Russia and
Napoleon Bonaparte of France.

Although the intrigue of

personalities poses several interesting questions about
the Europe of the period, the causes of and reactions
to the Treaty of Tilsit involve several larger, more
tangible issues.
Bonaparte spread a revolution that promoted a new
order, a new political system that threatened the status
quo of all Europe's monarchs. His new methods of diplo
macy and warfare were met by an archaic series of tra
ditional alliances which proved their inadequacies time
1
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and again.

Russia rose from a position of hapless oppo

sition to Bonaparte to become a major European power
with an influence far exceeding any it had held before.
The Treaty of Tilsit revealed Russia's new-found promi
nence and found Alexander and Russia attempting to develop
a diplomatic policy to meet the challenge.
Finally, problems of maintaining the peace in an
ethnically diverse, highly populated area of politically
divergent nations prevailed throughout the Napoleonic
period.

This question is approached from ideological

and pragmatic directions and notes the emergence of a
strong nationalism among all participants.

Prince Adam

Jerzy Czartoryski of Poland, Russian Foreign Minister to
Tilsit, emerged in the midst of such problems as a mostly
ignored architect of a nineteenth-century version of
peaceful coexistence.
This study covers the events leading up to the Treaty
of Tilsit as well as the immediate reactions to it.

It

will attempt to sort out the tangled alliances and mo
tives that culminated with Tilsit.

It will also offer a

reprisal of the significance of this highly romanticized
meeting of east and west and suggest the often forgotten
implications of its failings.

CHAPTER I
RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AFTER THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
The French Revolution of 1789 created a ripple of
apprehension throughout the European monarchies.

For the

first time in European history, rule by divine right had
been questioned and outwardly rejected.

The question the

revolution posed for the remaining monarchies was whether
they could continue to exist or whether they would be
eliminated.

Each country's reaction toward France was

subsequently guided not only by self-interest but also by
the fear of the spread of the revolution.

The ebb and

flow of European relations during the Napoleonic years
represent a vacillating struggle to achieve and maintain
peaceful coexistence and a sturdy alliance system.
One of the best examples of that period of diplo
matic fluctuation was the Treaty of Tilsit signed between
Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander I of Russia in 1807.
To understand the complexities involved in this treaty,
Russia's attitude toward France must be discussed.
In July 1789 when the French Revolution occurred,
Catherine II was the Tsarina of Russia.

Although con

sidered to be an enlightened despot, Catherine pursued a
3
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course of imperialism and Russian dominance, especially
in regards to Poland (the so-called "Northern accord")
and in the Balkans (the "Greek Project").
knowledgeable of things French.

She was quite

She corresponded with

Voltaire and held many of the French philosophes in high
regard.

It was no wonder, then, that she watched the

events of the French Revolution with a certain horror.
Her major fear, of course, was that anti-monarchic senti
ments might spread to Russia.

In October of 1789,

Catherine broke off all diplomatic relations with France.
Less than four years later, she signed a treaty of
mutual friendship and assistance with Britain.

In it,

Russia and Britain agreed not to make peace with France
until all of the French territories, illegally acquired
since 1789, were returned.

Russia also agreed to help

Britain in the war at sea by closing her ports to France
and by helping to curtail French maritime trade.
Besides her obvious fear of the revolution, Catherine
may have been reacting to another stimulus, a document
which today remains part fact and part fiction.

Referred

to as the Will, or Testament, of Peter the Great, this
document was supposedly left in the Russian archives by
Peter the Great himself.
tinental change including:

It was a blueprint for con
the partition of Poland, the

defeat of Turkey and, most importantly, the aggrandizement
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and prosperity of Russia through her direct involvement
in European affairs.
There are varying accounts of how and when this docu
ment made its way to France and came to public attention
in Russia.

One traces the French discovery of the Testa

ment to Chevalier d'Eon, a colorful man sent to
St. Petersburg to spy for the French government during the
Seven Years War.

Another credits Polish General Michel

Sokolnicki for making the document public in 1797.

Still

another links the Testament to Maurice de Talleyrand's
successor as the French Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Charles Louis Lesur, who in 1812 produced an anti-Russian
propaganda book based on its contents.'*’
Whether or not any of these accounts is true, or if
any document bearing any resemblance to the Testament
ever existed, the story itself indicates the difficult
atmosphere in which Russia was trying to become accepted
as an equal in western diplomatic circles.

Two different

generalizations can be made regarding the Testament of
Peter the Great and its influence in dictating Russian
policy.

If it did truly exist, Russia may have been

simply taking it as a guide for the future.

If it was

a mythical document, the lengths to which both France and
Poland went to embarrass Russia show the fear that Russia
produced in other European nations.

6

In November 1796, Russian rule changed hands.

When

Paul I succeeded his mother, Catherine, he decided that
his foreign policy should have two main goals:

to oppose

the ideals of the French Revolution and to maintain and
expand the Russian presence in the Mediterranean.

Both

goals could be pursued with the opportunity afforded by
the French occupation of Malta in June 1798.

Paul was

The Grand Prior of the Order of the Maltese Knights, and
it appears that he had the idea of using the knights as
an instrument with which to impede the spread of revolution.

2

The French occupation of Malta gave him the per

fect excuse to intervene in the affairs of the Mediter
ranean .
As French hostilities and aggressions continued
throughout Europe, Russia joined forces with Great
Britain, Austria, the Kingdom of Naples, and Ottoman
Turkey to form a second coalition against France.

(The

first coalition was a war which Bonaparte inherited from
the Directory.

Essentially it refers to the early

battles in Italy where Bonaparte gained his fame.)
Initially, it seemed to be a mutually satisfactory align
ment.

As problems developed among the powers, however,

the coalition began to weaken.
In 1800 Britain seized control of Malta from the
French and decided to retain possession of it.

This

occupation created an immediate shift in Russian policy,

7

for now Britain posed more of a direct threat to Russian
interests than France did, so Russia withdrew from the
Second Coalition.
The period that followed, during the winter of 18001801, became known as the rapprochement.

As the threat

of France seemed to be waning, Paul was able to survey
both Europe and Bonaparte in a new light.

Conversely,

having the enemy reduced by one, Bonaparte was able to
speculate about the idea of having Russia as an ally.

In

many ways, this period of rapprochement foreshadowed the
Treaty of Tilsit six years later.
Because formal diplomatic relations between Russia
and France had never been re-established after October
1789, this period of good feelings was remarkable.

Paul

reinstituted the League of Armed Neutrality against
Britain.

Bonaparte countered by offering to liberate,

without exchange, six thousand Russian prisoners taken
3
captive by France during the recent battles.
Simul
taneously, France and Austria were holding peace negotia
tions at Luneville.
The influence that Russia enjoyed in continental de
cisions became evident in subsequent events.

Paul wished

to play the role of ^.arbiter of Europe, especially in
4
German affairs," as Catherine had done in the past.
In the negotiations at Luneville, talks between France
and Austria were nearly deadlocked.

The major disagreement

8

involved France's refusal and Austria's wish to allow
Britain's entrance as a negotiator on the Austrian side.
The Russian emissary, Georg-Magnus Sprengporten, on
arriving in Luneville got the talks back on track.

Oddly

enough, it was a chain of misconceptions that accelerated
the entire process.
Unknown to Austria,

Sprengporten's one and only as

signment was to accept Bonaparte's release of the afore
mentioned Russian prisoners.

France, though, capitalized

on Austria's belief that Sprengporten was in Luneville to
represent Russia in the formal meetings and managed to
claim additional sanctions.

Austria's misconception led

her to proceed with the negotiations without Britain's
support.

Subsequently, Austria suffered substantial

territorial losses attributable directly to Luneville and,
Austria thought, to Russia.5
The signing of this treaty on February 9, 1801, tem
porarily brought peace to Europe and left Britain as
France's only adversary.

The treaty signified that

Russia's influence in continental affairs was growing
in more ways than on the battlefield.
It must be remembered that despite this seeming
Russian-French rapprochement, nothing between the two
nations had been formalized.

Formal relations were

never renewed from the break made by Catherine in 1789.
Simultaneously then, with the proceedings at Luneville,
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Count Fedor V. Rostopchin, Russian Chancellor and Presi
dent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made France
aware of the Russian terms for a new alliance.

Up to

this point, Paul's only concern at Luneville had been for
the integrity of Sardinia, Naples, Bavaria, and Wurttenberg.

He decided to turn to Rostopchin for his expert

opinion on foreign affairs and his advice on how best to
proceed with France.

According to Hugh Ragsdale,

Rostopchin believed that France "had met her master in
Bonaparte, who nurtured his power on fame and conquest,
humbling Austria, frightening Prussia into submission,
but not being able to reach England, his archenemy.

In

these circumstances Russia held the key to the European
balance of power, and the fact of Bonaparte's generous
offer to liberate the Russian prisoners indicated that he
realized it.

He was seeking to strengthen himself by en

listing Russia in the ranks."6
Paul agreed with Rostopchin.

Their plan was to send

Stepan A. Kolychev, Vice-Chancellor of the College
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to meet with Bonaparte and
Charles Maurice Talleyrand, the French Foreign Minister,
in hopes of gaining a new alliance.

Talleyrand, who was

suspicious of Russian interests and impatient with her
delays, now attempted to influence the Russian court
through a collection of unlikely correspondents, using
7
procedures far removed from the standard.
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With Paul's new-found attraction to Bonaparte and
his admiration for Bonaparte's military skills, there are
some indications that he was considering the use of
Russian troops to help Bonaparte invade India and begin
the destruction of British colonialism.

Whether or not

this was an actual plan is of little importance, because
a palace coup took place in St. Petersburg in March 1801,
after which Paul's son, Alexander I, assumed the throne
of Russia.

Russia's attitude toward France and Bonaparte

thus took another new direction.

NOTES

■'"Dimitry V. Lehovich, "The Testament of Peter the
Great," American Slavic and East European Review 7 (April
1948), pp. 111-124.
2

Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign
Policy 1814-1914 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Com
pany, 1964), p. 26.
3

Hugh Ragsdale, "The Origins of Bonaparte's Russian
Policy," Slavic Review XXVII (March 1968), pp. 85-90.
4Ibid., p. 85.
5Hugh Ragsdale, "Russian Influence at Luneville,"
French Historical Studies 5 (1968), pp. 274-284.
6Hugh Ragsdale, "The Origins of Bonaparte's Russian
Policy," p. 88.
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CHAPTER II

ALEXANDER I'S POLICY TOWARDS FRANCE
The reign of Alexander I marked a change in direction
and orientation of Russian foreign policy from that of
his predecessor, Paul I.

Among Alexander's first official

acts upon taking the throne was to re-establish friendly
dealings with both-Britain and Austria.

He also called

upon Rostopchin's enemy, the Francophile and Anglophile
Count N. P. Panin, to head the College Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.1

Upon sending Count Arkadii Ivanovich Morkov to

Paris as the Russian ambassador, Alexander wrote a long,
detailed instruction that summarized his thoughts about
Russia and her involvement in European affairs.

2

Alexander wrote to Morkov on June 27, 1801:
In order to achieve the entire goal that I seek,
I will begin by describing for you my [main] pur
pose, toward which you should direct all your
attention and for which develop modifications that
might be appropriate when considering any circum
stances that can be foreseen. In deciding to pur
sue the ongoing negotiations with France towards
the end of last year, I had been guided by a double
motive— one of which was to guarantee for my empire
a state of peace and tranquility necessary for re
establishing order in the different administra
tive parties, and at the same time to cooperate
as far as it could be in my power the hastening
of a definitive peace, which would at least give
Europe the time to restore structure to the

12
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social system, shaking it down to its founda
tions, so that providence would never again per
mit the source of the disaster to dry up, which
affects humanity.3
It was Alexander's desire to "esperer d'attendre en
alliant la fermete a la justice et a la moderation."^
The age of Russian expansion was drawing to a close
and a major directive in Alexander's foreign policy ob
served that trend and aimed to preserve the boundaries
that Russia had already established.

"If I ever raise

arms," Alexander wrote on June 4, 1801, in a circular note
to Russian diplomatic representatives abroad, "it will
be exclusively in defense against aggression, for
the protection of my peoples or of the victims of ambi
tions that endanger the peace of Europe. . . .

I shall

never participate in the internal dissensions of foreign
5
states.
Except for a brief flourish of initial changes,
Alexander's foreign policy was not formalized until 1803
with the issuance of the "Instruction."

It was drawn up

by Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and the members of
Alexander's informal committee, a group of advisors who
functioned as a sort of cabinet to Alexander.

In his

Memoirs, Czartoryski described this committee as "a
Secret Council composed of persons whom he [Alexander]
regarded as his friends and believed to be animated by
sentiments and opinions in conformity with his own."6
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Those who comprised the informal committee were all
friends of Alexander from his youth:

the aforementioned

Czartoryski, Count Paul Stroganov, Count Victor Kochubei,
and Nicholas Novosiltsev.

They also hoped for the

presence of Alexander's former tutor F. C. LaHarpe, al
though he declined to participate regularly.

In addition

to this informal committee, several other members of the
Russian intelligentsia were consulted from time to time.
Included In this list were:

Count Alexander Romanovich

Vorontsov, Count Nicholas Semyonovich Mordvinov, Prince
Platon Alexandrovich Zubov and Count Mikhail Mikhailovich
Speransky, and others.
The informal committee stopped meeting in 1803 be
cause all of the four members accepted posts in
Alexander's government.

Czartoryski became Deputy Minis

ter of Foreign Affairs under the aforementioned
Vorontsov, Stroganov became Deputy Minister of Justice,
and Kochubei and Stroganov served as Minister and Deputy
Minister of the Interior, respectively.

Alexander had

carefully laid the groundwork for an orderly system of
foreign affairs by surrounding himself with people he
trusted and admired.

Czartoryski mentioned that

Although the new system of policy was often criti
cised on account of vagueness and utopianism, it
soon had serious and practical results. It was
impossible to take prominent part in European
affairs, to come forward as a judicial and

15

moderating influence, to prevent violence, injus
tice and aggression, without coming into contact
with France at every step. She would have been a
dangerous rival if she had wished to play the
same beneficent part; but being led by the un
limited ambition of Napoleon, she sought to do
the very contrary of what we wished. A collision
sooner or later was inevitable.7
Alexander's foreign policy became clear in 1803 with
the completion of the earlier work by the informal com
mittee.

In a letter to Bonaparte on April 10, 1803,

Alexander noted

"It is with great pleasure, that I see

the affairs of Germany finally come to their end:

and one

must attribute this happy ending to the common measures
in this case taken by Russia and France whose union and
wisdom is not only valued by the two states, but must be
regarded as very essential for the happiness and tran
quility of all Europe."8

Indeed, Alexander already under

stood that the peace of Europe depended in large part on
an agreement between Russia and France.

George Vernadsky

credited that result coming from Alexander's "instruc
tion" as "one of the significant documents in the de
velopment of international law, since it proposed a pro
ject for international organization which should be con
sidered as a prototype for the League of Nations.

It

was also one of the first Panslavic declarations, since
it suggested the liberation of Slavs, both in Central
g

Europe and the Balkans."

The "instruction" revealed

the idealism of both Alexander and Czartoryski.

The

16

underlying principles behind it reappeared in their sub
sequent involvements in the affairs of Europe.
Unfortunately for Russia and the remainder of the
Slavic nations, the "instruction" did not become Russia's
policy.

It had been drafted with both France and Britain

in mind, as a show of Russian interests and aims in
Europe, during the very brief time when hostilities be
tween France and Britain had temporarily ceased.

Peace

had been declared on March 27, 1802, in the Treaty of
Amiens, which brought nine years of animosities to a
shaky end.

Britain's primary interest, despite this

treaty, had been and still remained the defeat of France
not the stabilization of Europe.
With the Treaty of Amiens in mind, Czartoryski
began the monumental task of trying to sway Britain to
Russia's favor.

Czartoryski realized, as did most of

Europe, that France and Russia were on a collision
course with destiny.

He noted that

The two Emperors went in opposite directions in
everything; one demolished, while the other re
stored, old ideas; and the comparison made be
tween them was not to Alexander's advantage in
the eyes of the very Russians for whom he was
working. He was, in fact, not all that popular
during the first few years of his reign, although
he was never more devoted than he was then to
the good of his country.
With obvious Russian and French tension ahead and
the lofty aims of the "instruction" to guide him,
Czartoryski proceeded to draft the plans for a Third
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Coalition against France.

It must be remembered that,

while he was serving Russia, Czartoryski was a Polish
prince whose nationalistic tendencies were obvious.
Several times during his service to Alexander and Russia
Czartorysky offered to step down from his position on
the grounds that his interest in Poland perhaps hampered
him in fully serving Russia's needs.

In terms of en

lightened service,however, Czartoryski was a most able
diplomat.
Alexander was, at this point in 1804, still main
taining the position held by both his grandmother and
father, which viewed Russia as a great arbitrator in
European affairs.

He still saw Russia as an integral

part in "a system of defense to prevent any further ad
vance or aggression on the part of France upon the terri
tory or independence of the rest of Europe."^^

But an

event in early spring, that scandalized much of Europe,
served to set Alexander's policies off in a different
direction.
On March 15, 1804, a former Bourbon prince,
Due d'Enghien, was abducted by one of Bonaparte's agents
from his castle in non-aligned Baden.

He was taken to

France, tried by a military commission, and executed on
March 20.

The news of these events sent the court of

St. Petersburg into official mourning.

Not only was the

Due d'Enghien taken from the native home of the Russian
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Empress Elizabeth Alexeievna, but Alexander also saw
Enghien's death as a murder and his abduction as a vio
lation of Baden's rights of neutrality.
sent a note of protest to Paris.
it was harsh and insulting.

He immediately

"The reply soon came:

Talleyrand, at that time

Minister of Foreign Affairs, reminded Russia that when
Paul was assassinated, France did not consider herself
justified in demanding an explanation." 12

Overall, the

event increased the Russian court's sympathy for French
emigres and heightened its disrespect for Bonaparte.
Coupled with the deterioration of the Treaty of
Amiens by May 1803, the assassination of the Due d'Enghien
brought Russia to the point of reconsidering policies.
France was advancing into Germany, occupying both Hanover
and the southern Kingdom of Naples, and showing interest
in the Mediterranean.

Although the possibility of a

Russian confrontation with France was slight, a policy of
containment was now a necessity.
By late 1803, control of the Russian foreign
ministry had passed almost completely from Count Simon
Vorontsov, who had clearly served as a figurehead, to
Czartoryski.

The first hint of a Russian-British alliance

was made in a dispatch from Vorontsov to Czartoryski dated
November 20, 1803.

In it, Vorontsov suggested that, from

what he could ascertain, France aimed at breaking up the
Ottoman Empire and once again attempting to seize Egypt

19

as a route to India.
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The Russian ambassador in Paris,

Arkadii Ivanovich Morkov, noted Bonaparte's willingness
to threaten war in Egypt in a letter dated February 16,
18 03, sent to Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov.'*'^

Regarding

this, Morkov said that Bonaparte "would declare war im
mediately, he already had an army of 400,000 soldiers
that he would augment with another 50,000 men, he would
try to execute a political fall in England, that he would
place himself at the head of this expedition."16
The news of such plans would undoubtedly evoke antiFrench sentiments in both Russia and Britain.

Czartoryski

believed that the Turks of the Ottoman Empire should be
removed from Europe, yet he did not want another European
nation with any established base of power located there.
In philosophical terms, he also saw Russia as a protec
torate of the coreligionists in the area and favored
Russia's benevolent control over Poland to be a pattern
17
for Russian dominance in the Balkans.
The threat of a
French invasion of India, of course, was intolerable to
Britain.

In a speech given on July 22, 1803, by British

Foreign Minister William Pitt, Britain's true feelings
about the inevitability of war with France were evident.
That the result of this great contest will ensure
the permanent security, the eternal glory of this
country; that it will terminate in the confusion,
the dismay, and the shame of our vaunting enemy;
that it will afford the means of animating the
spirits, of the rousing courage, of breaking the
lethargy of the surrounding nations of Europe;
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and I trust that, if a fugitive French army should
reach its own shores after being driven from our
coasts, it will find the people of Europe reviving
in spirits and anxious to retaliate upon France
for all the wrongs, all the oppressions, they have
suffered from her; and that we shall at length see
that wicked fabric destroyed which was raised
upon the prostitution of liberty, and which caused
more miseries, more horrors to France and to the
surrounding nations, than are to be paralleled in
any part of the annals of mankind.
Despite such favorable conditions for it in 1803,
the formation of another coalition against France was be
set by hesitation and differences of opinion among those
nations that would have to form it.

Austria was hesitant

to ally with Russia and Britain because of the distasteful
outcome of the Second Coalition and the peace concluded
at Luneville.

Prussia was hoping for some type of French

constancy, while Sweden was eager to join a coalition and
hoped to maintain the status quo while suppressing French
revolutionary tendencies.
Alexander and Czartoryski believed that to oppose
France meant more than to defend Europe militarily; it
meant creating a new order for the continent for years to
come.

Czartoryski believed that

It would have been a great advantage to obtain
the concurrence in our views of so powerful and
influential a State as England and to strive with
her for the same objects; but for this it was neces
sary not only to make sure of her present inclina
tions, but to weigh well the possibilities of the
future after the death of George III and the fall
of the Pitt Ministry. We had to make fngland
understand that the wish to fight Napoleon was not
in itself sufficient to establish, an indissoluble
bond between her Government and that of
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St. Petersburg, and that such a bond, to be per
manent, most be based not on a common feeling of
revenge, but on the most elevated principles of
justice and philanthropy.19
Throughout 1804, most of the dispatches from
St. Petersburg to London were delivered by special Russian
envoy

Nikolai Nikolaevich Novosiltsev.

Czartoryski said

of Novosiltsev that "in one hour's talk [he] would be
able to say more than a hundred sheets of paper." 20
Because there were both formal and private discussions
being held at this time, that method was used rather than
operating through the legitimate Russian ambassador to
Britain, Simon Vorontsov.

Although both Czartoryski and

Alexander had high regard for Novosiltsev's skills in the
art of diplomacy, they were worried about his highly
visible pro-British sentiments.

For this reason,

Czartoryski stayed in private contact with Vorontsov in
London about all the ongoing negotiations that both he
and Novosiltsev were undertaking.

Writing to a friend in

1836, Czartoryski gave his opinion of Novosiltsev:

"a

man without faith or principles, but very clever and
astute, and with much knowledge."

21

Late 1804, therefore, found Russia negotiating with
nearly every European state in hopes of forming a workable
coalition.

Early on in the negotiations, Russia was

hoping to receive British financial support in a war with
France.

In a letter to Count Simon Vorontsov, the Russian

Ambassador at London, dated June 26, 1804, the British
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Foreign Secretary Lord Dudley Ryder Harrowby briefly
described what Britain hoped for in a coalition that would
merit British financial support.
The particular appointment, to be regulated by a
future treaty, must depend, not only upon the
forces which each Power could bring into the field,
but upon its means of maintaining them, and in
some degree, upon the quarter in which they may
actually be employed.
This appointment must evidently be different
from the two suppositions
First. That Russia may be able to engage both
Austria and Prussia in the contest.
Secondly. That Russia may be joined by one of
these Powers only— in either case, some portion
might be left to bring forward any of the smaller
States, and particularly Sweden, in case that
monarch should transport his troops into Pomerania,
and co-operate, not merely for the defense of
that province, but also for the independence of
the north of Germany.22
On September 11, 1804, secret instructions from
Alexander I to Novosiltsev complemented those already re23
ceived by Vorontsov in.London.
(For a complete English
translation of this document refer to Memoirs of Prince
Adam Czartoryski, pp. 41-51.)

The main premise of the

"Secret Instruction" was to explain France's role in
Europe to the potential members of the coalition and sub
sequently to show how to create a new balance of power.
The most powerful weapon hitherto used by the
French, and still threatening the other European
States, is the general opinion which France has
managed to promulgate, that her cause is the
cause of national liberty and prosperity. It
would be shameful to humanity that so noble a
cause should be regarded as the monopoly of a
Government which does not in any respect deserve
to be the defender of it; it would be dangerous
for all the Powers any longer to leave to France
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the great advantage of seeming to occupy such a
position. The good of humanity, the true in
terest of the lawful authorities, and the success
of the enterprise contemplated by the two powers,
demand that they should deprive France of this
formidable weapon.24
Alexander and Czartoryski, in the "Secret Instruc
tion," believed that the only way France could be stopped
was through a Russian and British agreement.

Their two

fold goal was to liberate Europe from Bonaparte's yoke
and ensure a lasting peace among the nations.

Achieving

this would inevitably mean a war pitting Russia and
Britain against the French government, but not against
the French people.

The result of such a war would be

Europe's freedom from Bonaparte's rule and the realiza
tion of the right of national self-determination.
Czartoryski, recognizing the idealism in this idea,
took it one step further by trying to create a more
rational balance of power in Europe.

He hoped to use

the victory as an opportunity to establish a formal league
of nations which would be governed by a code of inter
national laws, including a type of world court which would
be used to mediate disputes and thereby avoid war.

In

addition to this, Czartoryski believed that to maintain
peace and harmony throughout Europe, the current concept
of political boundaries would have to be re-evaluated.
His suggestion was a redefinition of European boundaries
according to the principle of natural frontiers,
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but supplemented by the realities of nationality, eco
nomics, and geography.^
The details of this proposal called for a preventive
system designed to inhibit a recurrence of French ag
gression.

Central to this plan was the creation of a

federation of German and Italian states, protected by
both Prussia and Austria.

In exchange for the resulting

advantages for Prussia and Austria, Russia would gain
sovereignty

over Poland.

And from the Ottoman Empire

Russia hoped to receive some combination of Moldavia,
Cattaro, Corfu, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles.
Although both nations eventually agreed upon the
notion of an alliance and the subscription of other na
tions to their plan, harmony ended there.

Russia

favored a complete reconstruction of the map of Europe,
based on natural boundaries and nationalities.

Britain

favored status quo ante bellum, with France returned to
her former boundaries.

Russia was also willing to

negotiate with Bonaparte and offer France a chance for
reconciliation, while Britain wanted France to admit to
being guilty for causing the existing problems in Europe.
Russia was willing to accept any form of French govern
ment— a Bonaparte regime or a restoration of Bourbon
rule--as long as it was friendly to Russia.

But Britain

believed that a victory over France was the only way to
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peace.
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William Pitt carefully detailed British policy

regarding a potential concert of Europe in a memorandum
dated January 19, 1805.

In his memorandum the Prime

Minister listed three distinct aims for such a coalition
1st To rescue from the Dominion of France
those Countries which it has subjugated since the
beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France
within its former limits, as they stood before
that time.-2ndly To make such an arrangement with respect
to the territories recovered from France, as may
provide for their Security and Happiness, and
may at the same time constitute a more effectual
barrier in future against Encroachments on the
part of France-.—
3rdly To form, at the Restoration of Peace, a
general Agreement and Guarantee for the mutual
protection and Security of different Powers, and
for reestablishing a general System of Public Law
in Europe.--28
A potential rupture in the negotiations came in January
1805 when Bonaparte proposed that France and Britain
should conclude peace.

King George III commented on the

Emperor's offer:
I have received pacific overtures from the chief
of the French Government, and have in consequence
expressed by earnest desire to embrace the first
opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace,
on such grounds as may be consistent with the
permanent interest and safety of my dominions;
but these objects are closely connected with the
general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not
thought it right to enter into any more particular
explanation without previous communications with
those Powers on the Continent with whom I am
engaged in confidential intercourse and connection
with a view to that important object, and especi
ally the Emperor of Russia, who has given the
strongest proofs of the wise and dignified senti
ments with which he is animated, and of the warm
interest which he takes-in the safety and indepen
dence of Europe.29
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But much to Britain's dissatisfaction, Russia pro
ceeded to a series of secret agreements with Austria and
Sweden.

These accords, then, combined with Britain's

pressing fear of isolationism, became the impetus for
England to pursue a workable coalition with Russia without
further considering Bonaparte's overtures.

Vorontsov's

formal negotiations and Novosiltsev's more covert deal
ings successfully induced Britain to accept a compromise
after a seven-month struggle over details.^0
The Anglo-Russian Treaty, with separate, secret,
and additional articles, was provisionally formalized on
April 11, 1805.

But Britain, much to Russia's surprise,

failed to ratify the treaty.

Opposition to the treaty in

Britain was spearheaded by Prime Minister William Pitt,
who was reluctant to concede the Kingdom of Italy to
Joseph Bonaparte, concerned about a new code of maritime
law, and hesitant about the return of Malta to Russian
protection.

Regarding this final point, it must be

remembered that during the reign of Tsar Paul I, Russia
desired the control of Malta and the Maltese Knights, a
remaining vestige of the age of chivalry.

Britain, on

the other hand, insisted on keeping Malta because it was
her only remaining naval base in the Mediterranean.
The British rejection of the treaty terms caused a
stir among those in St. Petersburg who were waiting to
confront Bonaparte with a coalition.

From London on May
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10, 1805, Vorontsov wrote to Czartoryski, "You tell me
that if England will not yield Russia will not ratify the
Convention.

That being so, I can only regard the negotia

tions as broken off.

The Continent will be enslaved,

and this country will either make peace before Christmas
and keep Malta, or will continue a defensive war which
will cost it little money and will preserve the rock which
is the cause of all the existing difficulties."31
In another letter, eight days later, Vorontsov
wrote:
I may be blamed for not having in my official re
ports stated that England would never consent to
the evacuation of Malta, but I could not anticipate
that such a demand would be made by our Government,
as the matter was never mentioned to me, and in
the conferences which M. de Novosiltzoff had with
Mr. Pitt, both alone and in my presence, there
was no question of England abandoning Malta. . . .
The proposed new code of maritime law is equally
out of the question, and Lord Harrowby assured me
that if Lord G. L. Gower [British Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of
St. Petersburg] had yielded on these points he
would have been recalled, and never again employed
in the diplomatic service. The Government here
would have preferred that he should have altogether
refused to accept the note you addressed to him on
the subject of the maritime code, and that he
should have replied to you verbally that Great
Britain simply adheres to her practice during the
last two centuries in this matter, which is in
accordance with her treaties with Russia, Sweden,
Denmark, and Hoiland.32
The British government softened its position some
what as time passed.

But Pitt's address to the British

Parliament on June 21, 1805, revealed the problems that
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constantly plagued the coalition, hesitation and lack of
dedication.

Said Pitt:

I am ready to allow that the alliance of Russia
alone would not promise such effacious or power
ful co-operation as it would make it worth while
to protract the war on account of any hope it
would hold, or even equivalent for the large vote
of credit which is demanded; but it is my opinion
that even the limited co-operation of even a few
of the Powers, and for a short time, may be ma
terial service in the course of the war, in pro
tecting those points which the enemy appear
particularly anxious to attack.33
In early July 1805, France annexed Genoa.

This

move, coupled with, the negative British position regarding
Malta, encouraged Alexander to accept Britain's treaty
terms.

Lord Gower responded by immediately signing it in

its newly revised form on July 28, 1805.

On August 9,

Austria also signed the treaty.
At this pont, Novosiltsev was supposed to proceed
on behalf of the coalition to Paris and present to
Bonaparte the ultimatum deciding Europe's fate.

His pre

sentation was supposed to coincide with the day that
Russia moved armies into both Austria and Prussia--August
16.

Several papers in Hamburg, however, printed the news

of the cancellation of this mission by Alexander and
eliminated the diplomatic impression it could have made.
Instead, what remained was an allied force of Russian,
British, Austrian, Hanoverian, and Swedish troops poised
for their next move.
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CHAPTER III

THE CONDITION OF EUROPE:

1805-1807

The Third Coalition, formed in the summer of 1805,
was a fragile union of hurried alliances, put together in
response to Bonaparte's plans of aggrandizement.

Despite

all the negotiations prior to the agreement in 1805, it
satisfied neither Russia nor Britain in the long term
and was ill-fated from the outset.
The first problem faced by the coalition was to de
cide the status of Prussia.

King Frederick William III

was content with his position of neutrality.

While at

tempting to deal with several domestic problems in
Prussia, he saw non-alignment as the most beneficial way
by which he could pursue and ensure peace for his
country.

His beliefs were supported, not only by several

members of the Prussian court, but also by Prussia's
omnipresent fear of the French and the problems that
opposition to them could create.
The coalition needed the full cooperation of Europe
in order to dictate terms to Bonaparte.

The exclusion of

Prussia would only create a crack that France would seek
to penetrate and widen.

The coalition felt, in respect
33
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to Prussia, that two alternatives were available:

either

to induce Prussia to join them by offering monetary
and territorial gain or to force the issue militarily.
Such were the inauspicious beginnings of a coalition
which both Alexander and Czartoryski had idealistically
seen as the road leading to a new Europe.
wrote of this in his Memoirs saying:

Czartoryski

"I must admit that

the improbability of Prussia entering into the concert of
the Powers was not what I most regretted.

I did not

neglect any arguments calculated to persuade her, but I
foresaw with satisfaction the necessity of disregarding
her interests

in the event of a refusal, for in that

case Poland would have been proclaimed a kingdom under
the sceptre of Alexander."1

Part of Poland was currently

under Prussian rule; and, in the plan offered to
Alexander, Czartoryski saw those Poles rising up and join
ing Russia in opposition to Prussia.

Despite his obvious

concerns for the fate of Poland, Czartoryski's interests
have been seen by Marion Kukiel as generated by the most
noble of intentions for a better Europe.

2

The coalition's plan was to attack France from all
sides.

Britain was to press the naval campaign, while

Russia and Austria were to attack with combined armies
through central Europe and pick up help from such minor
allies as Hanover and southern Italy.

Czartoryski

favored the plan to force the Prussians into the coalition
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by declaring war on them at the appropriate time. He
believed that Prussia was Russia's natural enemy and
that an invasion of Prussia offered a logical solution to
the problem.

More important, though, were his secret

hopes for a reunified Poland through an armed Russian
intervention.

Upon entering Prussian Poland, Alexander

would be hailed as a liberator and could thus reunify
Poland by assuming the throne.

To this plan both Britain
3
and Austria gave their qualified consent.
Alexander, however, hoped to rekindle Prussian
friendship and avoid unnecessary battles.

Possibly sens

ing the troubles ahead, he was already beginning a gradual
return to his initial policy of observing the European
situation from a careful distance.

Czartoryski, in spite

of his strong nationalistic attractions toward Poland,
did his best to serve Alexander and Russia as Foreign
Minister.

The disagreement over Prussia, however, ef

fectively marks the beginning of the decline of
Czartoryski's influence on Russian affairs in Europe and
also marks a change in Alexander's notion of Russia's
role there.
From the first formation of the coalition, Austria
had hoped that Russia could persuade Prussia to join.
This wish was largely motivated by self-interest, because
Austria did not want Prussia to enjoy any more influence
in northern German affairs than it already did.

Austrian
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policy-makers believed that if Prussia was not allied
with Austria, exactly that situation would prevail.

It

was Austria's belief that, if she were allied with
Prussia, France would have no opportunity to interfere
with Hapsburg rule in northern Germany where Austria
presently held an upper hand.
Austria had hoped that its involvement in the coali
tion would not only help it maintain the status quo in
Germany but also help to reclaim Austrian positions in
Italy which France- had been assuming.

Austria was not

prepared for a war with France when she entered the
coalition.

From early on, Austria suffered from military

ineffectiveness in an age when Bonaparte's army was
revolutionizing the art of warfare.

Austrian military

reforms were slow to take hold, and several strategic
errors allowed Bonaparte to occupy Vienna in November
1805.

That French movement was quickly followed by the

crushing defeat of the Austrian-Russian army at Austerlitz
on December 2, 1805.
Before the year was out, Austria withdrew from the
coalition and signed a separate peace with France in the
Treaty of Pressburg (Bratislava).

Signed on December 26,

1805, the treaty acknowledged Austria's loss of power in
Italy and resulted in a declaration of independence for
the kingdoms of Bavaria, Wurttemburg, and Baden.

Russia,
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to plot her next move, retreated far enough east to be out
of Bonaparte's immediate reach.
Czartoryski sadly noted in his Memoirs that "I
should have liked to bring the two Emperors together so
as to ensure the safety of both, but I did not succeed.
The Emperor Francis [Austria] went off in a different
direction, but he charged me from time to time to com
municate with Alexander some words of consolation.

These

were always the same, assuring us that he had already
experienced similar disasters, and that although the blow
4
fell mainly upon himself, he was far from losing hope."
The defeat of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz left
Prussia alone to deal with France.

As Austria had feared,

France induced Prussia to remain neutral by offering her
the coveted possession of Hanover, the key to a power
base in northern Germany.

It is interesting to note that,

prior to her defeat at Austerlitz, Russia was making
similar promises to Prussia to induce her to join the
allies.

Pitt and Britain had been firmly opposed to that

alliance, but they learned of the Prussian-Russian
negotiations too late to protest.^
Like Alexander, Pitt felt that the tide of the
European war hinged on whether Prussia decided to align
with France.

Even after Austerlitz, Pitt sought support

for Prussia at home and abroad.

Speaking in November

1805 at a banquet in his honor, he stated

"Europe is
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not saved by any single man.

England has saved herself

by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by
g
her example."
But Pitt did not live to see the final
outcome.

The man, who for the previous two years had

directed the course of British foreign policy, died on
January 23, 1806.
The Prussians found themselves in the unattractive
position of acting as a French satellite.

On February 16,

1806, they signed another treaty with Bonaparte, the
Treaty of Paris.

This forced agreement required that

Prussia supply troops in any future battles with Russia
and added her to the economic blockade known as the
Continental System.

Britain responded to the new situa

tion by declaring war on Prussia on June 11, 1806.
Realizing that it was no longer maintaining a posi
tion of neutrality, Prussia decided to turn the tables
and declare war on France.

As Austria had earlier done,

Prussia picked the worst possible time for such a sig
nificant change of strategy.

Unfortunately for both

Russia and Britain, Austria, due to recent losses, had
been a negative factor in the Third Coalition.

That,

combined with Russia's recent retreat out of Bonaparte's
reach, left Prussia to fight the French on her own.
France soundly defeated Prussia at the battle of JenaAuerstadt on October 14, 1806, once again exhibiting
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the remarkable style of Napoleonic warfare. Eugene Newton
Anderson explained one of the many difficulties faced by
Frederick William III:
The history of his reign to his point had been
that of careful investigations and consultations,
each ending in disagreement and further consulta
tion. The practice continued before, during, and
after the battle of Jena. The duke [of Brunswick,
general in charge of Prussian troops] was undecided
and consulted the king; the king was uncertain and
consulted the duke; both were uncertain and con
sulted the staff officers. They were still dis
cussing the proper strategy when Napoleon attacked.
Further consultation was not necessary to estab
lish the fact or even the degree of the defeat.^
It must be remembered that Britain, upon the untimely
death of Pitt, underwent a change in direction with the
creation of a new government.

William Wyndham, Lord

Grenville, became Prime Minister in February 1806, and
one of Pitt's major adversaries, Charles James Fox, became
Foreign Secretary.

The stage seemed set for Bonaparte to

make a move.
In March 1806, a packet of dispatches was delivered
to a British naval officer just off the coast of Dover by
a French vessel flying the flag of truce.

In this packet

were two letters from Maurice de Talleyrand addressed to
o

Charles Fox.

These two letters were a response to Fox's

earlier letter of February 20 which initiated a call for
9
secret peace negotiations between the two nations.
This
was not, however, the officially santioned British policy
as shown in King George Ill's response to the trans
action .
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The King has read the correspondence which has
passed between Mr Fox & Mr. Talleyrand and regrets
very much that his name should have been mentioned
in any way, as he is by no means anxious to re
ceive commendation from such a quarter. His
Majesty trusts that his confidential servants will
upon consideration of what has passed think it
their duty to quash at the outset any idea or pro
posal of negotiations, and that Monsieur Talleyrand's
communication in which an opening is given, will
be looked upon as one of a nature entirely private
to Mr Fox and therefore not requiring official
notice.10
France lessened Fox's hopes for peace by insisting
that Russia not be involved in the negotiations.

But that

kind of secrecy was expressly prohibited by the agreements
made when the coalition was formed.

The episode shows the

skill of Talleyrand and Bonaparte in playing ally against
ally in order to create dissension within the coalition.
Thus, Fox could do nothing but attempt to resume Pitt's
policies and renew the war with France.
As was often the case with this coalition, the
allies' policies were contradictory.

As Britain hoped to

increase the scope of continental war, the Russian
entourage was returning home to lament its loss at
Austerlitz and re-evaluate its policy.

The break between

Alexander and Czartoryski had by now become almost com
plete.

Alexander wanted neither to accept the respon

sibility for the defeat nor to admit that Czartoryski's
plan involving Poland may have proved to be wiser.
stead, Czartoryski became a political scapegoat for

In
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Alexander, and his role and influence diminished until
his departure from the foreign ministry in June 1806 .^
Czartoryski continued throughout 1806 to draw up
plans for a Russian recovery.

He still favored his plan

of allying Russia more firmly with Prussia than with
Austria.

He believed Russia should be pressuring the

Ottoman Empire to take a defensive stand against France,
even if that meant reinforcing Russian power in the
Adriatic.

He also believed that the relationship with

Britain should be closely maintained, because, besides
Russia, only Britain could stand up to Bonaparte.

If

war became a reality, he believed Russia should establish
two fronts, one in northern Europe and one in the Ottoman
Empire.

In Europe, the Poles, along with the Prussians,

would lend assistance; and, in the southeast, a similar
approach, using nationalism as a motivation, would
induce the Greeks and southern Slavs to support the

„
. 12
Russians.
Alexander was taking Czartoryski's advice less and
less, and,in most cases, he acted directly contrary to
it. 13

The Tsar, instead, was moving much closer to a

policy of peace at all costs and war only if Russian soil
was threatened.

Czartoryski, in a memorandum to

Alexander dated January 17, 1806, attempted to remind
him of what their original goal had been upon the
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formation of the coalition and how the tsar's present
philosophy contradicted those beliefs.
Russia does not wish to acquire anything for her
self, but she is not willing, and she ought not,
to lose the place and character which a century
of glorious achievements has assigned her.
Satisfied with her advantages, her only ambition
has been to preserve the weak against the attacks
of the strong; her weapons have been appeals to
the right and justice, and she has only used
force when those weapons have proved ineffectual.
When the employment of force has also not been
successful, the general confidence of mankind
has been her reward, or has made her forget her
temporary reverses.^
Fox had been frequently consulting Czartoryski about
the possibilities of renewing the war with France.
Czartoryski, while eager to act, was in a position of
diminished authority, a situation which both Nikolai
Nikolaevich Novosiltsev and Pavel Alexsandrovich Stroganov
were also experiencing.15

But Alexander was thinking

along different lines, entertaining notions of negotia
ting a peace treaty with France and turning his back on
continental affairs.

Frustrated at being unable to

serve Russia to his. best ability, Czartoryski got
Alexander to accept his retirement from office.

In his

final official memo to Alexander on March 22, 1806, he
again stressed the potential problem in Russia's course
of action.
During the last four years Russia and her allies
have four times made overtures of peace to
Napoleon, and on each occasion the shameful con
ditions which he imposed and the outrageous pre
tensions which he put forward rendered peace
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impossible. . . . Finally, England— the only Power
which by her dominion over seas can in combination
with us still justify the hope of a possible
equilibrium in Europe--always faithful to our
alliance, always frank in her transactions with
us and strict in fulfilling them, showed herself
ready to second us everywhere, and was actually
doing most effectually in the Mediterranean and
on the Adriatic.16
Alexander, assuming the role of Foreign Minister,
proceeded in the opposite direction.

He decided to send

Pierre d'Oubril to Paris as Russian plenipotentiary to
negotiate peace terms.
1806.

A treaty was concluded in July

Several reports suggested that Alexander decided

to sign this peace despite the concessions that Russia
17
.
would have to make to France.
The reaction in St.
Petersburg,however,was much different.

Eventually,

Alexander saw the futility of abandoning Europe in favor
of France and did not ratify the treaty.

His change of

heart was due primarily to dissatisfaction with its
terms, especially regarding France's dominance in
Germany (which Alexander did not care to recognize),
Bonaparte's dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and
the organization of the Confederation of the Rhine.
Desiring to save face before the members of his court,
Alexander banished Oubril from Russia for his role in
drafting this treaty.
Alexander now found himself needing an able foreign
minister to replace Czartoryski. While many, both in
Russia and particularly in Britain, hoped for the return
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of Czartoryski, such was not to be.

Instead, Alexander

invited Andrei Gotthard Budberg to serve in that position.
Budberg had been one of Alexander's tutors, but he was
neither as close a friend as Czartoryski nor as ideo
logically compatible with Alexander.

Due in part to his

ever-failing health and in part to the monumentak tasks
he faced in following the charismatic Czartoryski,
Budberg's influence on Alexander was slight during his
short tenure.

The policies that Budberg advocated for

Russia were a return to those of Catherine the Great.

He

suggested not only conquest in Poland and partition in
Turkey, but also a coalition with France against
D .. • 18
Britain.
In October 1806 France attacked Prussia in an at
tempt to divide the coalition even further. Acting on a
personal commitment to Frederick William III which dated
back to the spring in Memel in 1802, Alexander called
the Russian forces back into action.

Slowly, the Russian

army moved westward in response to the French attack.
While Russian forces were moving to the aid of
Prussia, other non-Russian forces were being moved into
the Danubian principalities, territories which Russia
sought.

Since about 1802, Russia had had some control

over local appointments of officials, or hospodars, in
both Moldavia and Wallachia.

This movement was part of

a growing Russian presence in the Balkan region which
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greatly concerned Sultan Selim III of the Ottoman Empire.
Russia's difficulties gave the Sultan a chance to recoup
some of his control in the Balkans.
The role of the Ottomans in the coalition was
founded on a somewhat traditional Franco-Ottoman friend
ship.

This had been breached, however, in 1798 when

France invaded Egypt and threatened Ottoman territory dur
ing the Second Coalition.

The Ottomans opposed France

during the War of the Second Coalition and concluded an
armistice and peace in 1801-1802.

A general lessening of

the Ottoman Empire's control over its outlying provinces
shortly followed.

Its weakened position was exacerbated

by Russia's access to the Mediterranean, its protectorate
over the Ionian Islands, and its involvement in Moldavia
and Wallachia.
In a response to this heightened Russian influence,
Selim III attempted to resume the Empire's former alli
ance with France in 1802.

Bonaparte would agree only if

Selim III followed a strictly anti-Russian policy.

As

this failed to materialize to his liking by late 1805,
Bonaparte instead made overtures to Persia for an alli
ance and hoped that the Ottomans would remain neutral.
While French military successes weakened the Third Coali
tion, Selim III planned to save his empire and regain
lost territory by now allying with France and Persia.
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When the Ottoman Empire resisted Russian influence in
the Danubian region, Russia quickly countered by sending
troops.

This whole episode culminated in the Ottoman
declaration of war on Russia in December 1806. 19
Involved in the Prussian-French confrontation and
at war with the Ottomans, Russia now was involved in the
two-front war that Czartoryski had warned against since
the defeat at Austerlitz.

Near the end of 1806, the

French had captured Prussian papers that exposed the
earlier Russian-Prussian agreement at Memel.

Bonaparte

now realized that Alexander had been playing France and
the allies against one another and he decided to go to
war against Russia.

In December 1806 he advanced into

Poland and won a major victory against Russia at Eylau
on February 8, 1807.
Bonaparte was now in a dangerous situation.

His

troops had advanced far into Poland and were short on
supplies and in a difficult position for quick, accurate
communications with rear command and Paris.

The situa

tion in which Bonaparte found himself reflects his notion
that diplomacy should always be a reflection of military
strategy. 20

His uncertainty about Austria's and

Britain's positions led him to pursue peace if for no
other reason than to replenish his forces.
With Russia caught in a two-front war, Bonaparte
had once again effectively spread out and splintered his
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opposition in Europe.
at bay.

Prussia was presently being held

Austria's Foreign Minister, J. P. Stadion, was

strongly opposed to France, but problems, both internally
and externally, left Austria afraid of any potential war.
Britain's "Ministry of All the Talents" was hardly
Austria's sympathetic ally of the Pitt years, and British
indecision left the coalition lacking in solidity.
When war between Russia and France resumed in the
spring of 1807, Russia's allies did not come to its aid.
The grand plan to -reorganize Europe had dwindled to a
series of diplomatic maneuvers and well-choreographed,
lightning-quick battles.

The final blow was dealt to the

Third Coalition on June 14, 1807, when Russia suffered
another major military defeat at Friedland.
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CHAPTER V

DRAFTING THE TREATY OF TILSIT
The Third Coalition came to an end with the French
defeat of the Russians at Friedland, a battle which
Bonaparte described at the time as being "as decisive as
Austerlitz, Marengo and Jena.""*- Despite the French vic
tory, Bonaparte was impressed with the Russian army and
had no desire to pursue an eastern European campaign
any further.

Bonaparte's wish was to arrive at a speedy

settlement and free himself for more important issues:
the formulation of a new policy regarding Britain and the
reorganization of his holdings in Italy and Germany.
Alexander was, by that point, thoroughly disillu
sioned with the Third Coalition.

He resented the British

lack of dedication to being involved in continental af
fairs, the ineffectiveness of Austrian troops and poli
tics, and Prussia's quick surrender to the French.

He

believed, after suffering another major defeat at the
hands of the French, that the only chance to save his
reputation, both at home and throughout Europe, was by
forging a major diplomatic triumph in cooperation with
Bonaparte.
50
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Following the battle at Friedland in East Prussia
(now Pravdinsk in the Soviet Union), Alexander sued
Bonaparte for peace, and the stage was set for the dra
matic meeting between the two emperors at Tilsit.

The

first meeting between Alexander and Napoleon indicated
both the geopolitical reality as well as the anticipation.
In terms of historiography, this scene is most of
ten recounted when discussing Tilsit for it is the pre
cursor to modern meetings of heads of state.

Unfortu

nately, much of the significance of Tilsit is lost in
the appeal of the theatrics.

Albert Vandal best

described the meeting:
At this moment, Alexander had two objects of
aversion, England, which poorly supported him, and
Austria, which failed to answer his entreaties.
One is assured that the first word to the Emperor
was the following:
"Sire, I hate England as much
as you."— In that case Napoleon would have
responded, "peace is made. "2
In fact, the tone of the negotiations had an air of
high drama with the bulk of the lengthy discussions being
conducted on a raft in the Niemen River equidistant from
each bank.

That location had been a concession made by

Bonaparte to show respect for Alexander's rank.

Maurice

Paleologue well depicts the romantic setting:
The arrangements of that memorable interview, the
decor, the setting, the behaviour of the chief
actors and the supernumeraries, all the details
of that grand spectacle have been fixed for long in
the popular imagination: the raft in the middle of
the Niemen; the two Emperors publicly proclaiming
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their friendship; their smiling walks together arm
in arm, through the gaping little town; their
interminable rides along the banks of the river
and in the neighbouring forests; their military
parades; the solemn distribution of decorations
to the bravest soldiers in both armies; the
enthusiastic fraternisation between the Imperial
Guard of Russia and of France and their rapturous
shouts of: "Long live the Emperior of the East!
Long live the Emperor of the West! Then, in the
evening, the two monarch's withdrawing anew for
long and secret confabulations, from which they
emerged equally delighted with each other .3
Despite the setting, historical consensus agreed
that Bonaparte had never intended that Alexander be his
equal either in stature or in power on the continent,
either immediately or in the future.

The negotiations and

subsequent treaty represented another in a long history of
Napoleonic diplomatic triumphs. But, in contrast to that
consensus, historians have speculated widely about
Alexander's motives and his reasoning.
At least one has interpreted Alexander's diplomacy
4
as having been a "desertion of Prussia at Tilsit."
It
is that point which separates the Treaty of Tilsit from
the previous continental agreements made during Alexander's
reign.

Prior to Tilsit, Alexander had adhered to the

1802 Memel agreement that tied his hands in all in
stances to favor Prussia and which left Russian policy to
be, in some cases, not in Russia's best interests.
Another view, more sympathetic to the French, analyzes
from a larger perspective the reasons Russia signed the
Treaty of Tilsit.

"In all classes of [Russian] society
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abuse was showered on the man who lost the battle of
Friedland and, to crown his infamy, had 'prostrated him
self at the feet of the victor and faternised with him.'
Never before, people said, has Russia, Holy Orthodox
Russia, the Russia of Peter the Great and Catherine the
5
Great, submitted to such ignominy."
In one way, Tilsit
represented a pivotal point in Alexander's psychological
make-up, for while he was led by Bonaparte to believe
that he was his equal, Alexander's own nation and his
allies were shocked and disappointed by his actions.
The treaty was concluded in separate accords on
June 29 and July 9, 1807, and signed in the city of Tilsit
(now Sovetsk).

In addition to arranging an armistice

with France, Alexander also acted on behalf of both
Prussia and Poland.

The majority of the final decisions

came out of the meetings held between Alexander and
Bonaparte.

Their agreements were then passed down to

a smaller committee which formalized the ideas into a
treaty. In these meetings Talleyrand represented France,
and Prince Alexander Borisovich Kurakin and General
Prince Dmitry Lobanov-Rostovsky represented Russia.
The treaty, which was made known to all of the
European powers, consisted of twenty-nine articles that
dealt primarily with new boundaries and new rulers of
continental Europe.

It also hinted at a series of new

alliances which were actually formalized in a series of
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secret articles.

The secret articles, which were known

within a few months, were not published in Britain,
neither in the Times
records.

nor read into the Parliamentary

(See the appendix for an English translation

of the treaty which appeared in the Times (London) on
August 8, 1807.)
That the treaty was punitive to both Austria and
Prussia was not surprising, since neither of those na
tions was a strong ally in the coalition nor a difficult
adversary for the French army.

Of the two nations, Prussia

suffered the most severe losses.

The French occupation

of Prussian territories following the battle of
Friedland was settled by the treaty, resulting in a loss
of nearly one-half of Prussia's population and one-third
of Prussian territory.
dix.)

(See Article IV in the appen

Also by the terms of the settlement, Prussia agreed

to reduce its army to 40,000 men and to pay a war in
demnity of some one hundred million francs to France.
It was only through Alexander's personal appeal to
Bonaparte that Frederick William III was allowed to remain
on the throne of a Prussia now reduced in size.
Articles IV, V, and XI in the appendix.).

(See

In this

respect, Alexander remained at least superficially true
to his pledge given to Frederick William III at Memel.
Prussian and Austrian losses since the formation
of the coalition in 1805 included two major setbacks that
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predated the Tilsit accords:

the abolition of the Holy

Roman Empire and Bonaparte's acceptance of the Protec
torate of the Confederation of the Rhine, both of which
took place in 1806.

Many of the German states that were

included in the Confederation had at one time or another
been under Austrian or Prussian control.

They were now

divided among the four German client states that France
had acquired since the revolution and formed the heart of
the Confederation:

Baden, Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstedt, and

Wurttenberg.
Another section of the treaty (Articles V, XIV,
and XVIII), which specifically named rulers to several
thrones throughout Europe, allowed Bonaparte to affirm
nepotism in his empire and to raise members of his family
to monarchial status.

From Prussian territory the King

dom of Westphalia was created, over which Bonaparte
placed his brother, Jerome, as king.

Louis Bonaparte was

made King of Holland, and all of these were united in the
Confederation of the Rhine.

Throughout the period from

1806 to 1808, several other family members were given
royal positions.

The period surrounding the Treaty of

Tilsit represented a peak in Bonaparte's goal of empire
and dynasty.
Poland's configuration also changed because of
Tilsit.

(See Articles V, VII, and IX in the appendix.)
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Prussian Poland became the Grand Duchy of Poland under the
direct rule of the King of Saxony, another French puppet.
The parts of Poland acquired by the Russians in the
previous forty years still remained under Russian con
trol.

Yet, to regard Poland from a strictly geographic

standpoint, it is not clear why Bonaparte would not cede
additional Polish holdings to Russia under any circum
stance, for in many ways Poland acted as a buffer between
Russia and the west, which now was quite apparently a
French dominion.

For Bonaparte to cede additional

territory to Russian Poland, however, would be to open
the door to Polish hopes for a reunification and subse
quent independence.

The fate of Poland at Tilsit high

lights a recurring motif in Polish history which pitted
its eastern identities against its western ones and left
Poland caught in the middle, never able to act strongly
in either direction.
The remaining sections of the treaty dealt with
peace settlements, alliances, and diplomatic intervention.
Regarding the recent Russian and Ottoman declaration
of war on one another in 1806, Bonaparte offered to
serve as a mediator to make an equitable peace between
the two empires.

(See Article XXIII in the appendix.)

In a secret clause to the treaty, Bonaparte also pledged
to Alexander that should negotiations fail, France would
enter the conflict on Russia's side.

A similar agreement
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was reached in Tilsit regarding Britain.

In this case

Russia assumed the role of mediator and potential ally to
France.

If Britain could not come to terms with France,

Russia would join France in a declaration of war on
Britain; and a secret clause outlined an ultimatum which
would be delivered to Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal in
that circumstance.

The ultimatum would demand closing

ports to Britain and British goods and breaking off diplo
matic relations with Russia and France.

Together, Russia

and France would declare war on any nation failing to
comply.
The Treaty of Tilsit ended the Third Coalition.

It

reunited Russia and France for the first time since 1801.
The similarities between that period of rapprochement and
this new one became evident almost immediately.

The

treaty appeared on the surface to reduce Europe to two
friendly regions, one dominated by Russia and the other
by France.
The treaty succeeded in buying time for Europe to
attempt to forge a more desirable peace.

But, as usual

throughout the entire Napoleonic period, that peace could
only come from war.
The immediate effects of Tilsit achieved peace
through the polarization of Europe (except for Britain)
into spheres of territorial control.

The position of

virtually every European nation had now been decided by
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either defeat or declaration.

The only major remaining

question mark was Britain, and, with Russian policies
being more favorable to France, Bonaparte could turn all
of his attentions directly to Britain's defeat.

In ef

fect, while the Treaty of Tilsit created an atmosphere of
peace, in reality it was a calm before the storm, leaving
the nations of Europe wondering what was going to happen
to the European balance of power in the coming months and
years.
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CHAPTER V

EFFECTS AND REPERCUSSIONS OF THE TREATY OF TILSIT
The Treaty of Tilsit left Europe in a state of dis
array.

Austria and Prussia were downcast and defeated,

both without strong allies and without competent armies.
Their many internal problems had combined with their
failure to adapt themselves to Bonaparte's recent
geopolitical changes in Europe.

After Tilsit, they

found themselves subservient to France, without much hope
of mounting a successful opposition or constructive re
action to French aggression.
Britain, as a result of Tilsit, found itself to be
the target of France's attempt to remove it from the
European arena.

By forming a rapprochement, with Russia

and arranging mainland Europe in a temporarily satis
factory alignment, Bonaparte gained the time and oppor
tunity to focus his attentions on Britain.

Unwittingly

perhaps, or blinded by hubris, Bonaparte never realized
that he had granted Russia the same freedom of action as
France.

Alexander, despite the agreements of Tilsit, was

not interested in challenging Britain.
became more attractive.
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Other goals soon

61

Immediately following the Treaty of Tilsit, Bonaparte
was at the peak of his control over Europe.

His position

ing of various relatives on the thrones of Europe was his
direct attempt not only to show this power but also to
legitimize his empire in terms which all the monarchies
of Europe would understand and fear.

Since 1802,

Bonaparte had doubled France's territorial holdings.

The

next step of his plan was to ensure the maintenance of
his empire by enforcing the Continental System against
Britain and thereby weakening Britain's economic influence
on the continent.
Bonaparte's Continental System had been initiated,
though not named as such, as early as 1800-1801 with the
French-Russian period of rapprochement, when Tsar Paul I
revived the Russian League of Armed Neutrality.

Essen

tially, the Continental System called for the exclusion
of all British goods from ports under French control.
But the system did not declare that European goods could
not be exported to Britain.

The system was conceived as

being punitive for Britain, but not for the rest of
Europe.

The underlying concept was to reduce Britain's

income, create a drain on her treasury, and ultimately
stop the flow of British money to France's enemies.
British financial support of France's enemies obviously
concerned Bonaparte, therefore he hoped to weaken Britain
economically.

Britain was a major naval power during
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Napoleonic times and virtually untouchable by any con
temporary navy.

From this, Bonaparte reasoned that eco

nomic warfare would defeat Britain in a way that the
French navy could not.
As Bonaparte's domination of Europe expanded, so
did his ability to enforce the blocking of British imports.
Despite Britain's huge empire, she could not ignore the
European market without weakening the British economic
system.
France, befotre 1803, also had holdings in North
America which Britain feared could be the start of a
rival colonial system that could possibly challenge
British markets,'*' although, by the time of Tilsit,
Bonaparte had forgotten about world domination and was
focused primarily on Europe.
On November 21, 1806, Bonaparte issued the Berlin
Decree.

This document announced that Britain was now

in a state of blockade and that all nations were pro
hibited from importing from or exporting to Britain.
Bonaparte warned that British goods in European terri
torial waters would, from that day on, be seized and
o
confiscated.
The Berlin Decree marked the official
establishment of the Continental System.

When the

settlement at Tilsit was concluded, Britain was
effectively shut out of European affairs— economic as
well as political.

Bonaparte was able, at long last,
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to enforce his Continental System against Britain and
expected to receive help from virtually every European
port and nation.
Britain was in a difficult political situation—
as well as economic.

During the French-Russian negotia

tions at Tilsit, Britain was again faced with the task of
creating a new government.

Lord Grenville's so-called

"ministry of all talents" had collapsed in early March
1807.

Both Grenville and Foreign Minister Charles James

Fox had hoped to ensure peace for Britain during their
short period of power.

Despite Britain's inactivity on

the European battlefield, her role in all the previous
European coalitions had been a major one, for Britain
had poured large sums of money into continuing the oppo
sition to Bonaparte.

In 1805-1806, Pitt had provided

seven million British pounds to help support the wars of
the Third Coalition.

With the change from Pitt to

Grenville in early 1806, the subsidies decreased to a
relatively small amount.

The allies viewed this decrease

as a sign of British selfishness and withdrawal from
continental affairs.

2

Because of Grenville's cautious

policies and because of the growing pressures of the
Continental System, Britain had gradually withdrawn from
financial support of even limited warfare against
France.
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In the spring of 1807, the Duke of Portland, William
Cavendish Bentinick, became the titular head of the
British government.
came into power.

With him, two of Pitt's proteges

George Canning became the foreign secre

tary and Lord Robert Stewart Castlereagh became the
secretary of war.

After the failings and hesitation of

British policy following Pitt's administration, these
three men represented a return to Pitt's concepts of
coalition— staunch opposition to France and support for
European unity. 3 The new English government sought quite
different things for Europe from those presented to it by
the Treaty of Tilsit.
The initial British reaction to the Treaty of Tilsit
was published in the London Times on August 12, 1807.
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
Times, though not an official organ of the British govern
ment, often described official British policy.

The

columns of the Times provided a forum for discussion but,
more importantly, served to spread information to the
British upper classes.

Parliamentary debates, govern

mental decrees, and world developments were all prominently
displayed in the pages of the Times.
The mood following Tilsit was one of utter contempt
for the French and especially for Bonaparte.

"Everything,

in short, within the range of his power, is to be cut
and modeled after the French fashion.

As if the concern
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of the French Empire was insufficient for the vast grasp
of his mind, he has gratuitously assumed the regulation
and the superintendence of all those Governments he has
4
created or tolerated. '!
Overall, the educated British understanding of the
Treaty of Tilsit saw it as a minor tragedy waiting to en
large and manifest itself.

On August 12, an editor wrote

"We should have expected that the interferences of
ALEXANDER, and the peace of Tilsit, would have put an end
to the exactions and oppressions of these harpies
[Bonaparte and Talleyrand].

Quite the contrary.

The

spirit of rapine seems to increase in proportion to the
shortness of their stay in the conquered territories."5
Yet, in this case, the editors of the Times did not
seem to see through the publicly announced parts of the
Treaty to its secret clauses which contained the essence
of the French-Russian alliance.

One month after the

Treaty of Tilsit was concluded, on August 12, the Times
printed the following advice:
The difficulties which stood in the way of a
liberal commercial intercourse, between this
Country and Russia, are not, we are happy to learn,
likely to last much longer. Some very satisfactory
information on this important subject, has been
received from St. Petersburg. The latest letters
from that city speak generally with confidence
as to the removal of the recent restrictions upon
foreign commerce. It is stated in one of these,
"that things have taken a more favourable turn;
and that great hopes are entertained that the
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Commercial Treaty with England will be speedily
revived, and affairs placed upon their former
footing."6
Regarding the proposed Russian mediation in the con
clusion of a treaty between Britain and France, the
British Parliament concluded that such an arrangement was
of no benefit to Britain.

The Times noted that when a

similar proposal had been made to France in 1805,
"Bonaparte refused such mediation.

'No,' said he, 'you

have an army on foot to force your terms on me; but what
means have you to.compel England to comply with your
mediatory proposals?'

Why then has he so readily accepted
7
this mediation in the present instance?"
As to how that decision further involved Alexander,

and more importantly the Russian army, Britain hoped
Russia would be peaceful.

Again the Times speculated:

"'Such are the terms,' he [Alexander] may say, 'I, as im
partial umpire between you, propose for your acceptance:
if you refuse them, you must terminate your own quarrels
O
yourself, I desist from any further interference.'"0
In late August, a pamphlet appeared in London en
titled, "A Key to the recent Conduct of the Emperor of
g
Russia."
Although it cannot be considered to reflect
official British intelligence, the pamphlet demonstrated
that the Treaty of Tilsit did not escape the notice of
upper-class British society.

The existence of the

pamphlet showed the concern which some sections of the
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British opposition had about the new Russian-French al
liance.

In it, Alexander's motives were declared to be '

generated by the humiliation of Russian forces on the
battlefield and Alexander's personal disgust with the en
tire situation.

The pamphlet stated that Tilsit was

signed because "Alexander could not stoop to receive what,
instead of being considered due to him, was to be con
ferred on him as a favour of obligation.

He therefore,

took the weight of the war upon his own shoulders. . . .
The pamphlet's author, whose identity was not revealed,
maintained that Alexander applied to Britain for a loan
on his personal account for five million pounds.

This

loan was apparently refused on the basis of Grenville's
philosophy toward the continental war.

Obviously annoyed

by the refusal, the author of the pamphlet wrote,
Can it be believed, then, that a Country in which
every hope of Europe was centered, which not only
might but ought to have contributed to its sal
vation, and which, at least, ought to have per
formed what was its duty, and not favourable to
ALEXANDER, refused the sum to save the continent,
which was scarcely more to her than a few drops
from the ocean? Such was, however, the case.I1
The pamphlet stated the changing policies of Britain
toward the continent, and especially Russia, because of
the Treaty of Tilsit.

In the mind of the pamphlet's

author, Tilsit might not have been signed if Britain
had fervently supported Russia throughout the many coali
tions and military campaigns.

This support, however, had

68

to be all encompassing:
and emotional.

financial, military, political,

Britain's own irresolute policies con

tributed heavily to the crisis now faced after Tilsit.
The Times of September 7, 1807, reported about
another factor affecting British policy— the antagonism of
the United States of America.

The Times reported that

"The political horizon, both to the East and West, appears
at present sufficiently dark and louring.

Russia on the

one side, and America on the other, are, if reports say
true, ready to wreak their wrath upon us."

12

The po

tential conflict with Russia had something to do with
Britain's defense of the neutrality of the Danish navy.
This was a relatively small matter which camouflaged the
underlying British sentiment that "Russia is no match
for France without the assistance of England.

Where then

is the prudence of Russia's uniting with France to sub13
jugate, or even weaken England?"
As Castlereagh's power
began to increase, British policy turned to the possi
bility of another coalition with Russia against France.
With respect to America, Britain was seeing the origins
of what would culminate in the War of 1812.

Britain was

already questioning America's motives for entering into
Europe's affairs.

The editors of the Times wrote, "They

are far removed from the scene of European carnage, and a
more destructive warfare than ever desolated Europe.
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Why would they rush, like a dazzled insect, into a flame
which does not approach them?" 14
Britain was now caught in a difficult situation.
America was reigniting a flame of rebellion, and Russia
appeared to be joining France in war directed against it.
In early October 1807, the Times included several reports
of the recent armistice concluded between Russia and
the Ottoman Empire and mediated by France.

British

opinion suggested that Russia was making too many un
necessary sacrifices in the settlement, specifically the
cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Turks.

From

this, Britain, at least as shown by the Times, believed
that of those provinces Bonaparte would create another
vassal state for France.

"Everywhere he [Bonaparte] is

cooping up, and surrounding the Russian monarchy, whose
destruction, were England overthrown, would not linger
one year; and yet that same Russia hesitates at the part
she is to act in the present contest between us and
France; nay, hesitates between hostility to us and bare
neutrality. . . ,"15

By October 17, reports from

throughout Europe were printed in the Times recounting
what Britain had been fearing for several months, an
embargo of British goods consigned to Russian ports.

16

In late November, the entire contents of the Treaty
of Tilsit, except for the secret articles, were finally
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made available in Britain.

Reports from the Times' many

foreign sources reached London and led the Times to pre
dict :
We cannot wonder at the opinion that Russia will
be forced or seduced to declare war against us
ultimately, though it may not take place until
spring, when alone the Baltic will be open for
naval operations, and when the armies of France
may be ready to punish the Emperor ALEXANDER for
refusing to join the league, by wresting from him
his possessions in Poland, Courland, and Livonia,
not for getting his conquests in the last war,
secured to him by the peace of Tilsit . ^
Opinion of knowledgeable Russian leaders about these
developments was no more enthusiastic than those in London.
Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich, the grandson of Tsar
Nicholas I, writing in Paris in the early twentieth cen
tury, remarked:

"The new alliance was unpopular in

Russia but particularly in Moscow.

The displeasure did

not cease until after the rupture; but Alexander, without
a worry for either public opinion or the complaints of
the dignitaries, followed the firm path that he had out
lined, imposing silence not only to those in Moscow so
ciety, but down to the Imperial Family's nearest rela-

The Russian gentry, dismayed at the terms of Tilsit
because of the great concessions made to Bonaparte,
directed the majority of the blame at Russian Foreign
Minister Budberg.

Budberg had attempted to resign from

service during the Tilsit negotiations, but Alexander
refused to accept his resignation.

Perhaps aware of what
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was to come, Alexander decided to use Budberg as a scape
goat to bear the brunt of any possible objection to the
treaty that could arise in Russia.

Bulberg, however,

had had no part in negotiating the treaty and had actually
opposed the idea of a Russian-French alliance. 19
Near the end of 1807, Alexander dismissed Budberg
and appointed Count Nikolai Petrovich Rumiantsev to the
post of Russian foreign minister.

The choice of

Rumiantsev was an interesting one for it allowed
Alexander to proceed with a policy of duality toward
France.

Rumiantsev "supported the French alliance, not

as a Western-oriented Francophile who blithely sanctioned
the aggressive conquests of Napoleon but rather as a
patriotic Russian who believed the alliance to be in the
best interests of his native country."

20

As Rumiantsev

pursued favorable Russian relations with France,
Alexander had, in essence, the perfect decoy in place
to formulate a covert policy against France.
Rumiantsev's policy proposed that Russia should not
be directly involved in the affairs of western Europe.
He believed that Russia's coexistence with Bonaparte
could be advantageous, both diplomatically and terri
torially, only if Russia were to expand to the north and
to the south rather than to the west.

Rumiantsev be

lieved that if Bonaparte controlled in the west, he
would allow Russia a free hand to negotiate with the
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Ottomans in the Balkans and would also tolerate Russian
expansion into Finland and Sweden.

Although Bonaparte

would allow Russian domination in both Finland and Sweden,
he would never allow Russia to possess the Straits and
especially not Constantinople.

Early in 1808, to prove

his loyalty to the terms of Tilsit and to turn Russia's
thoughts from Constantinople, Bonaparte suggested a joint
venture of Russian and French troops to march into
India.

21

Russian imperial ambitions, however, remained

in the Danubian regions and looked to the north.

22

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit, King
Gustavus IV Adolphus of Sweden, long an enemy of
Bonaparte, remained true to his alliance with Britain.
The geographic realities of having a hostile nation so
near to St. Petersburg prompted Russia to invade Sweden
in February 1808.

Sweden was easily conquered and the

Russian forces proceeded to Finland and annexed it as a
Russian holding the following month.

By late March,

King Gustavus Adolphus abdicated his throne, and Russia
had expanded territorially and increased the size of
what was by now referred to as the "empire of the east."
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CONCLUSION

Bonaparte, despite being allied with Russia by
the Treaty of Tilsit, allowed Russia only limited oppor
tunities for aggrandizement in comparison to the seem
ingly limitless opportunities he reserved for French
expansion.

In essence that one-sidedness was the major

reason Tilsit failed to last as a peace treaty.

Although

Bonaparte schemed to dominate Europe, he believed that
he could allow Russia to remain a power only in the east.
Bonaparte felt that such an arrangement was needed
to allow him the time for the formation of new policies
aimed at continental domination.

Tilsit afforded

Bonaparte the luxury of reshaping Europe without the
friction generated by Russia that had proved to be more
than a passing irritation in the past.
Russia, in terms of sheer numbers, had always posed
a large military threat to any major French campaign.
Russia was also an unknown quantity of sorts.

Up to the

time of Tilsit, neither Russia's diplomatic nor military
presence could be accurately assessed.

It was only

after Alexander came to power that Russia's numerically
superior military forces were augmented by thoughtful,
cautious diplomacy, fueled with both idealism and
75
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self-interest.

While Tilsit gave Bonaparte a freer hand

to deal with other matters, including especially Britain,
it also gave Alexander a similar free hand to pursue
Russia's interests.

That Russia's interests might not

continue to support France's was a fact not fully ap
preciated by Bonaparte.

In general, Russia could no

longer be taken lightly in European and Ottoman affairs
and Bonaparte underestimated her growing role in that
direction.
Only four years after Tilsit, events made it obvious
that Bonaparte had overestimated the potential benefits
of Tilsit and had been over-confident about the immediate
and longlasting effects of the treaty.

During the

Napoleonic period, Russia asserted her prominence and
importance in continental decisions, and the Treaty of
Tilsit clarified that fact.

The treaty itself, if we ig

nore the romanticism surrounding the emperors' meeting,
offered Russia a practical and significant entrance into
European affairs.
Britain also recognized Russia's emergence as a
powerful nation-state.

Her fault was not in underesti

mating a Russian presence, but rather in failing to
capitalize on this new phenomenon in a timely way for the
good of Britain and Europe.

Britain suffered throughout

the period by underestimating Russian diplomatic and
military abilities.

British leaders watched Russia gain
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in importance in European affairs, yet they were often
distracted from the concerns of the continent by their
many colonial responsibilities.

Their age-old hostility

toward France kept them from matching British policy to
the new geopolitical realities that Bonaparte was rapidly
imposing upon the continent.

Their hesitancy to use

Russia as a counterweight in this struggle marked their
major diplomatic failure of the period.
Russia, and Alexander in particular, more ac
curately gauged th'e situation.

Alexander was not afraid

to change Russia's policies and alignments to meet changing
needs.

He attempted to enhance Russia's stature in

Europe and, especially through Czartoryski, to install an
equitable and enlightened system of peace.

Even his

idealistic policies, which played a less important part
shortly after Tilsit, were, however, more realistic than
those of either Britain or France.
Caught in this three-way struggle were all the
countries of central Europe, most notably Prussia and the
Hapsburg empire.

As a result of the many coalitions and

of Bonaparte's determination, the Central European coun
tries either fell under foreign rule or their boundaries
were radically altered.

Essentially these monarchies had

serious difficulties for which the Tilsit period offered
only fear, defeat, and frustration.
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The Treaty of Tilsit symbolized a new system of
foreign affairs brought about by revolutionary France and
Bonaparte.

The accepted methods of warfare and diplomacy

were being replaced by modern techniques more suited to
the times.

Once all the nations became accustomed to

these developments, Europe seemed gradually to settle
into the status quo ante and to resume the normal, or at
least regular, course of international affairs--a course
that led by 1812 to French defeat.

But for the historian,

Tilsit clarified those changes in techniques, changes
which were often not clear to contemporaries.

In general,

however, the Treaty of Tilsit was more than an annoyance
to the balance of power in Europe, but less than a trauma.

AFTERWORD

The Treaty of Tilsit offers a strangely ironic
foreshadowing of twentieth-century European affairs.

As

early as 1805, the ever-growing problems of modern alli
ances, the rise of nationalism, economic warfare, and
ultimately, the distinction between eastern and western
Europe are becoming clear.

The Treaty, because of its

falterings, has often been relegated to a footnote in
textbooks.

But, in terms of western European histori

ography, the Treaty of Tilsit offers substantial insight
into many subsequent European conflicts.
For example, if the events surrounding the Treaty
of Tilsit were extrapolated, they could be considered a
model for many events leading up to World War II and its
settlement.

They are highly suggestive of the Nazi-

Soviet Pact, the Winter War, and decisions made at Yalta
and Potsdam which dealt with many of those same issues—
Poland, the Balkans, Germany.

Czartoryski's policy

and the failings of the Third Coalition could be an
eighteenth-century equivalent of Woodrow Wilson and the
League of Nations.

Czartoryski, in this particular

setting, assumes the role of the misunderstood diplomat
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firmly grounded in idealism, while the rest of the world
focuses only on current conditions.
The course of French-British relations has been an
important factor in making Russia the fulcrum of a
European balance.

This role also allowed Russia not

only to become important in European affairs, she did
so while still retaining a major position in parts of
Asia.
Overall, the Treaty of Tilsit offers a glimpse of
the Europe of the future with a foreshadowing of major
trends earlier initiated by the French Revolution.

The

revolution essentially proved that monarchies were no
longer the standard forms of government that they had
been in the past.

Tilsit also showed that alliances

based on that same system were quickly giving way to
those based on nationalism and to a diplomacy based on
the concepts of national self-interest and spheres of
influence.
In light of Tilsit, it is interesting to read a
passage written by the historian George F. Kennan; while
doing so, one can imagine him to be describing the Europe
of 1807 rather than the one of the twentieth century.
The things people thought they were trying to
achieve by the long and terrible military exer
tion in Europe were simply not to be achieved by
this means. The indirect effects of that war— its
genetic and spiritual effects— were far more
serious than people realized at the time. We can
see, today, that these effects penalized the
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victor and vanquished in roughly equal measure,
and that the damage they inflicted, even on those
who were nominally the victors, was greater than
anything at stake in the issues of the war it
self. . . . Both sides hoped for more than could
really be achieved. Both underestimated the
seriousness of the damage they were doing to themselves— to their own spirit and to their own
physical substance— in this long debauch of hatred
and bloodshed.^
The Treaty of Tilsit, for all of its shortcomings,
gave Europe a textbook study of modern international rela
tions and the problems that come with them.

That signifi

cance of its interpretation was not noticed or remembered
has proved to be sadly apparent in our current ideologi
cal east-west conflict.

NOTES

^"George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin
and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961),
pp. 9-10.
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TREATY OF TILSIT AS PRINTED IN
Times (London), 8 August, 1 8 0 7 , p. 1 .
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF FRENCH,
THE KING OF ITALY, AND HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF ALL THE
RUSSIAS.
His Majesty, the Emperor of France, King of Italy,
Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and his
Majesty the Emperor of Russia, animated with the same
interest in putting an end to the devastations of war,
have, for this purpose, nominated and furnished with full
power on the part of his Majesty the Emperor of France
and King of Italy, Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Prince
of Benevento, his Great Chamberlain, and Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour,
Knight of the Prussian Order of the Black and of the Red
Eagle of the Order of St. Hubert.
His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, has,
on his part appointed Prince Kourakin, his actual Privy
Counsellor; Member of the Council of State, and of the
Senate; Chancellor of all Orders in the Empire; Ambas
sador Extraordinary, and Plenipotentiary of his Majesty
Knight of the Russias to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria;
Knight of the Russian Order of St. Andrew; of St.
Alexander; of St. Aube; of the first class of the Order
of St. Wolodimir, and of the second class of the
Prussian Orders of the Black and Red Eagle; of the
Bavarian Order of St. Hubert; of the Danish Order of
84
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Dannebrog, and the Perfect Union, and Bailiff and Grand
Cross of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem;
and Prince Demety Labanoff Van Rostoff, Lieutenant
General of the armies of his Majesty the Emperor of all
the Russias; Knight of the first class of the Order of
St. Anne, of the Military Order of St. Joris, and of the
third class of the Order of Wolodimir.
The abovementioned, after exchanging their full
powers, have agreed upon the following Articles:
ARTICLE I.
From the day of exchanging the ratification of the
present Treaties, there shall be perfect peace and amity
between his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King
of Italy, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias.
ARTICLE II.
Hostilities shall immediately cease at all points
by sea or land, as soon as the intelligence of the pre
sent Treaty shall be officially received.

In the mean

while, the High Contracting Parties shall dispatch
couriers extraordinary to their respective Generals and
Commanders.
ARTICLE III.
All ships of war or other vessels, belonging to
the High Contracting Parties or their subjects, which
may be captured after the signing of this Treaty, shall
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be restored.

In cases of these vessels being sold, the

value shall be returned.
ARTICLE IV.
Out of esteem for his Majesty the Emperor of all
the Russias, and to afford to him a proof of his sincere
desire to unite both nations in the bands of immutable
confidence and friendship, the Emperor Napoleon wishes
that all countries, towns, and territory, conquered from
the King of Prussia, the Ally of his Majesty the Emperor
of all the Russias, should be restored, namely, that
part of the Dutchy of Magdeburg, situated on the right
bank of the Rhine; the Mark of Prignitz; the Uker Mark;
the Middle and New Mark of Grandenburg, with the excep
tion of the Circle of Kotbuss, in Lower Alsace; the
Dutchy of Pomerania; Upper, Lower and New Silesia, and
the County of Glatz; that part of the District of the
Netze, which is situated to the northward of the road
of Driesen and Schneidemuhl through Waldau to the Vistula,
and extending along the frontier of the circle of
Bromberg, and the navigation of the river Netze and of
the canal of Bromberg, from Driesen to the Vistula and
back, must remain open and free of all tolls;
Pomerellia; the island of Nogat; the country on the
right bank of the Vistula and of the Nogat, to the West
of Old Prussia, and to the Northward of the circle of
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Culm; Ermeland.

Lastly, the kingdom of Prussia, as it

was on the 1st of January, 1772, together with the
fortresses of Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Breslau,
Schweidnitz, Neisie, Brieg, Kosel, and Glatz, and in
general all fortresses, citadels, castles, and strong
holds of the countries above-named, in the same condition
in which those fortresses, citadels, castles, and strong
holds may be at present; also, in addition to the above,
the city and citadel of Graudentz.
ARTICLE V.
Those Provinces, which, on the 1st January, 1772,
formed a part of the Kingdom of Poland, and have since,
at different times, been subjected to Prussia (with the
exception of the countries named or alluded to in the
preceding Article, and of those which are described
below the 9th Article), shall become the possession of
his Majesty the King of Saxony, with power of possession
and sovereignty, under the title of the Dutchy of Warsaw,
and shall be governed according to a regulation, which
will insure the liberties and privileges of the people
of the said Dutchy, and be consistent with the security
of the neighbouring States.
ARTICLE VI.
The City of Dantzic, with a territory of two
leagues round the same, is restored to her former
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independence, under the protection of his Majesty the
King of Prussia, and his Majesty the King of Saxony; to
be governed according to the laws by which she was
governed at the time when she ceased to be her own mis
tress .
ARTICLE VII.
For a communication betwixt the kingdom of Saxony
and the Duchy of Warsaw, his Majesty the King of Saxony
is to have free use of a military road through the
States of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

This road,

the number of troops which are allowed to pass at once,
and the resting places, shall be fixed by a particular
agreement between the two Sovereigns, under the mediation
of France.
ARTICLE VIII.
Neither his Majesty, the King of Prussia, his
Majesty the King of Saxony, nor the City of Dantzic
shall oppose any obstacles whatever to free navigation
of the Vistula under the name of tolls, rights, or
duties.
ARTICLE IX.
In order as far as possible to establish a natural
boundary between Russia and the Duchy of Warsaw, the
territory between the present confines of Russia from
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the Bug to the mouth of the Lassona shall extend to a
line from the mouth of the Lassona along the towing path
of the said river; and that of the Bobra, up to its
mouth; that of the Narew from the mouth of that river as
far as Suradiz; from Lissa to its source near the vil
lage of Mien; from this village to Nutseck, and from
Nutseek to the mouth of that river beyond Nurr; and fin
ally, along the towing path of the Bug upwards to extend
as far as the present frontiers of Russia.

This terri

tory is for ever united to the Empire of Russia.
ARTICLE X.
No person of any rank or quality whatever, whose
residence or property may be within the limits stated in
the above-mentioned article, nor any inhabitant in those
provinces of the ancient kingdom of Poland, which may be
given up to his Majesty the King of Prussia, or any per
son possessing estates, revenues, pensions or any other
kind of income shall be molested in his person, or in
any way whatever, on account of his rank, quality, es
tates, revenues, pensions, income, or otherwise, or in
consequence of any part, political or military, which he
may have taken in the events of the present war.
ARTICLE XI.
All contracts and engagements between his Majesty
the King of Prussia and the ancient possessors, relative
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to the general imposts, the ecclesiastical, the military
or civil benefices, the creditors or pensioners of the
old Prussian Government, are to be settled between the
Emperor of all the Russias and his Majesty the King of
Saxony; and to be regulated by their said Majesties, in
proportion to their acquisitions, according to Articles
V. and IX.
ARTICLE XII.
Their Royal Highnesses the Dukes of Saxe Cobourg,
Oldenburg and Mecklenburgh Schwerin, shall each of them
be restored to the complete and quiet possession of
their estates; but the ports in the Duchies of Oldenburgh and Mechlenburgh shall remain in the possession
of French garrisons till the Definitive Treaty shall be
signed between France and England.
ARTICLE XIII.
His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon accepts of the
mediation of the Emperor of all the Russias, in order to
negotiate and conclude a Definitive Treaty of Peace
between France and England; however, only upon condition
that this mediation shall be accepted by England in one
month after the exchange of the ratification of the
present Treaty.
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ARTICLE

XIV.

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias being
desirous on his part to manifest how ardently he desires
to establish the most intimate and lasting relations
between the two Emperors, acknowledges his Majesty
Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples, and his Majesty Louis
Napoleon, King of Holland.
ARTICLE XV.
His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, acknow
ledges the Confederation of the Rhine, the present state
of the possessions of the Princes belonging to it, and
the titles of those which were conferred upon them by the
act of the Confederation, or by the subsequent treaties
of accession.

His said Majesty also promises, informa

tion being communicated to him on the part of the
Emperor Napoleon, to acknowledge these Sovreigns who may
hereafter become members of the Confederation, according
to their rank specified in the Act of Confederation.
ARTICLE XVI.
His Majesty the Emperor of all Russias cedes all
his property in the right of Sovreignty to the Lordship
of Jever, in East Friesland, to his majesty the King of
Holland.
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ARTICLE XVII.

The present Treaty of Peace shall be mutually bind
ing, and in force for his Majesty the King of Naples,
Joseph Napoleon, his Majesty Louis Napoleon, King of
Holland, and the Sovreigns of the Confederation of the
Rhine, in alliance with the Emperor Napoleon.
ARTICLE XVIII.
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, also
acknowledges his Imperial Highness, Prince Jerome
Napoleon as King o-f •Westphalia.
ARTICLE XIX.
The kingdom of Westphalia shall consist of the
provinces ceded by the King of Prussia on the left bank
of the Elbe, and other states at present in the posses
sion of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon.
ARTICLE XX.
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages
to recognize the limits which shall be determined by
his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, in pursuance of the
foregoing XIXth article, and the cessions of his Majesty
the King of Prussia (which shall be notified to his
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians) together with
the state of possession resulting therefrom to the
Sovereigns for whose behoof they shall have been estab
lished.
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ARTICLE XXI.

All hostilities shall immediately cease betwaen
[sic] the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of all the
Russias and those of the Grand Seignior, at all points,
wherever official intelligence shall arrive of the sign
ing of the present Treaty.

The High Contracting parties

shall, without delay, dispatch Couriers extraordinary,
to convey the intelligence, with the utmost possible
expedition, to the respective Generals and Commanders.
ARTICLE XXII.
The Prussian troops shall be withdrawn from the
Provinces of Moldavia, but the said Provinces may not be
occupied by the troops of the Grand Seignior, till after
the exchange of the Ratifications of the future Defini
tive Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Ottoman
Porte.
ARTICLE XXIII.
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias accepts
the mediation of his Majesty the Emperor of France and
King of Italy, for the purpose of negociating a peace
advantageous and honourable to the two powers, and of
concluding the same.
The respective Plenipotentaries shall repair to
that place which will be agreed upon by the two powers
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concerned, there to open the negociations, and to proceed
therewith.
ARTICLE XXIV.
The periods, within which the High contracting
parties shall withdraw their troops from the places which
they are to evacuate pursuant to the above stipulations,
as also the manner in which the different stipulations
contained in the present treaty, shall be executed, will
be settled by a special agreement.
ARTICLE XXV.
His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of
Italy, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians,
mutually ensure to each other the integrity of their
possessions, and of those of the powers included in this
present treaty, in the state in which they are now
settled, or further to be settled, pursuant to the above
stipulations.
ARTICLE XXVI.
The prisoners made by the contracting parties, or
those included in the present treaty, shall be restored
in a mass, and without any cartel of exchange on both
sides.
ARTICLE XXVII.
The commercial relations between the French
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empire, the kingdom of Italy, the kingdoms of Naples and
Holland, and the Confederated States of the Rhine, on
the one side; and the Empire of Russia on the other,
shall be replaced on the same footing as before the war.
ARTICLE XXVIII.
The ceremonial between the two Courts of the
Thuilleries and Petersburgh, with respect to each other,
and also their respective Ambassadors, Ministers, and
Envoys, mutually accredited to each other, shall be
placed on the footing of complete equality and recipro
city.
ARTICLE XXIX.
The present Treaty shall be ratified by his Majesty
the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and his
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Ratifica
tions shall be exchanged in his city within the space of
four days.
Done at Tilsit, 7th July, (25th June), 1807,
(Signed) C. MAURICE TALLEYRAND, Prince of Benevento.
Prince ALEXANDER KOURAKIN.
Prince DIMITRY LABANOFF VAN ROSTOFF.
A true Copy.
(Signed) C.M. TALLEYRAND, Prince of Benevento.
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